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»A sort of devil« (Keynes on Freud, 1925): 
Reflections on a century of Freud-criticism 
In 1925, the Hogarth Press published the third volume of the translation of Freud's 
Collected Papers, prepared by James and Alix Strachey - the ,Case Histories<. On 
13 June 1925, ecologist and psychoanalyst A.G. Tansley published a complimen-
tary review of that book alongside a translation of Stekel's Peculiarities of Beha-
viour, in the The Nation & The Athenceum, one of the handful of weekly magazi-
nes bought by the educated elite. On 4 July 1925 the magazine's letters column fea-
tured an »emphatic protest« from E. C. Allmond, B. Sc. (Lond.) against the tone of 
Tansley's review, on the grounds that this tone would appear to make of Freud's 
doctrines a contribution »comparable with the Copernican theory in Astronomy 
and the Einstein theory in Physics. « 1 The letter-writer cited a number of recently 
published criticisms of Freud's works and insisted that, until these criticisms had 
been satisfactorily answered by the exponents of Freud's teaching, no review as fa-
vourable as Tansley's should be published, on the grounds that it is »entirely mis-
leading.« 
On 8 August 1925, Tansley replied to Allmond's letter. Tansley noted that it was 
true that many psychologists take no notice of psychoanalysis, but that was be-
cause they were ignorant of it. Many others condemn it and Tansley presumes that 
the reason for this is that: »Freud's teaching is undoubtedly very astonishing, and 
his theories certainly give a first impression of being bizarre and grotesque to an ex-
treme degree - and this apart from the disgust and general repugnance they arouse 
in many people. ( ... ) Freud probes far more deeply and painfully (even than Dar-
win), and is even more bitterly attacked.« 2 Tansley went on to concede that psycho-
analysts and their supporters had not replied sufficiently to a major critical study 
that had caused considerable stir in England which Allmond had cited, namely A. 
Wohlgemuth's A Critical Examination of Psycho-Analysis, published in 1923.3 
Nonetheless, Tansley went on, »I have devoted what intelligence and critical judg-
ment I may possess to a first-hand as weil as to a literary study of Freudian analy-
sis« and found no alternative to accepting Freud's hypotheses because they give ex-
planations for hitherto neglected or inadequately explained fundamental pheno-
mena of the human mind. 
The edition of 22 August 1925 contained three letters responding critically to 
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Tansley, from Allmond, from Dr A. Wohlgemuth, and from Sir Bryan Donkin. 
Donkin argued that the silence of psychologists on the question of psychoanalysis 
demonstrated their refusal to accept its doctrines and the silence of the analysts in 
replying to Wohlgemuth gets to the »basic question as to the soundness of the prin-
ciples and the value of the practice of the Freudian cult ( ... Namely) there are many 
who deem that the doctrine contains the seeds of its own dissolution, and therefore 
are disinclined to discuss it.« Wohlgemuth's letter referred readers to the debates in 
the specialist journals and emphasized that psychoanalysis displayed a »flagrant 
and persistent disregard of scientific method.« And he added: »I feel quite convinc-
ed that Professor Tansley's observance of the (scientific method, J. F.) in his own 
domain of botany is more rigorous than in his New Psychology or he would not 
enjoy the great reputation he does.« 4 Miss Allmond's letter introduced a new note: 
»(T)he doctrine of psycho-analysis is not an objective explanation of certain phenomena of the hu-
man mind at all, but a subjective reaction to these phenomena; that the result of dream analyses 
carried out by Freud are revelations of the mind of the laner even more than of the early history of 
the patient. (This charge of subjectiviry, J. F.) could only be completely refuted by the carrying out 
of experiments, carefully controlled in accordance with the ordinary laws of scientific method.« 5 
The controversy rumbled on in the next number of the magazine, with two let-
ters, one by P. McBride, whose depiction of the issue was stark and simple: »Does 
the theory of psycho-analysis rest upon a scientific basis, or does it depend upon 
imagination?« 6 And he addressed the following question to Tansley: »Has he found 
(in Freud's The interpretation of dreams, J. F.) any data which have been verified or 
which are capable of being verified on lines such as would meet the demands of a 
critic accustomed to weigh scientific arguments? ( ... ) Repeated investigation, how-
ever, convinced me that the large volume contained no such proof.« 
The other letter - by far the most interesting intervention in the debate - publis-
hed on 29 August 1925 was signed by Siela, a pseudonym for John Maynard Key-
nes.7 Here is the entire text of Keynes's letter: 
»Sir, - I venture, as an outsider, to suggest that the truth about the importance to be anached to the 
ideas of Professor Freud lies somewhere between the views expressed by your learned correspon-
dents. 
Professor Freud seems to me to be endowed, to the degree of genius, with the scientific imagination 
which can body forth an abundance of innovating ideas, shattering possibilities, working hypothe-
ses, which have sufficient foundation in intuition and common experience to deserve the most pa-
tient and unprejudiced examination, and which contain, in all probabiliry, both theories which will 
have to be discarded or altered out of recognition and also theories of great and permanent signifi-
cance. 
But when it comes to the empirical or inductive proof of his theories, it is obvious that what we are 
offered in print is hopelessly inadequate to the case - that is to say, a very small number of in-
stances carried out in conditions not subject to objective control. Freudian practitioners tel1 us that 
they are personally acquainted with a much greater number of instances than those which have 
been published. But they must not complain if others base their criticisms merely on what is before 
them. 
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I venture CO say that at the present stage the argument in favour of Freudian theories would be very 
little weakened if it were to be admitted that every case published hitherto had been wholly inven-
ted by Professor Freud in order CO illustrate his ideas and co make them more vivid in the minds of 
his readers. That is CO say, the case for considering them seriously mainly depends at present on the 
appeal which they make to our own intuitions as containing something new and true about the 
way in which human psychology works, and very little indeed upon the so-called inductive verifi-
cations, so far as rhe latter have been published up-to-date. 
I suggest that Freud's partisans might do weil to admit this, and, on the other hand, his critics 
should, without abating their criticism, allow that he deserves exceptionally serious and entirely 
unpartisan consideration, if only because he does seem CO present himself co us, whether we like 
him or not, as one of the great disturbing, innovating geniuses of our age, that is to say as a sort of 
devil. - Yours, &c., SIELA. «8 
The form of Keynes's five-paragraph argument is worth spelling out. The first 
paragraph announces that he will position himself between the combattants, a man 
of objectivity without parti pris. The second paragraph acknowledges Freud's ex-
traordinary fertility, yet hints that some of his striking ideas may not stand the test 
of time - the jury is not yet even out. In the third paragraph, he castigates Freudians 
for not making available to others the evidence they affirm they possess and, in 
consequence, should respect the scepticism and misgivings of their opponents. All 
of these arguments are indeed those of an even-handed intelligent layman sympa-
thetic both to the bold ideas of Freud and to the rational misgivings of sceptics. 
lt is in the final two paragraphs that Keynes introduces an entirely different 
note, which renders his previous arguments almost besides the point. He imagines 
the effect on the impartial layman of learning that Freud's cases were pure inven-
tion, and concludes that this would not change one's attitude one jot. So he draws 
the implication: Freud's impact does not lie in evidence as commonly understood -
objective results, carefully recorded and published - but depends instead on »the 
appeal which they make to our intuitions as containing something new and true ab-
out the way in which human psychology works «. In the final paragraph, Keynes 
turns to address the warring factions, much as he was used in these years to addrcs-
sing the financiers and statesman of Europe as they struggled to maintain in place 
the Versailles agreement, the reparations imposed on Germany and the banking 
system of Europe and America. Both sides should admit that Freud speaks directly 
to our intuitions and little to our judgement of the weight of »inductive verificati-
ons«; in consequence, both sides should cease to blame the other. The upshot is not 
entirely neutral: the onus of Keynes's argument falls on Freud's critics, rather than 
his partisans. lt is they who have to make room for something new in their view of 
Freud - this appeal he makes to our intuitions, which Keynes then expands upon: 
» he does seem to present himself to us, whether we like him or not, as one of the 
great disturbing, innovating geniuses of our age, that is to say as a sort of devil. « 
Thus Keynes has inserted a different kind of figure between the two invoked by 
Freud's partisans and critics: instead of the great scientist, discoverer of new truths 
to place alongside those of Copernicus and Darwin, and instead of the unscientific 
72 ÖZG 14.2003.2 
purveyor of fantasies that are the product of his own feverish imagination, Keynes's 
Freud is a hybrid of the two, and something beyond both. Yes, Freud is a a great 
scientist akin to Darwin (or, to give a hint of an argument yet to come, of Keynes 
himself); yes, Freud is a man of unmatched fantasy and great speculative leaps. The 
little phrase ,whether we like him or not< introduces the notion of some kind of ob-
jective measure of Freud's cultural standing. Freud, Keynes intimates, stands above 
personal likes and dislikes, since he is a genius of the age, perhaps its very own 
Zeitgeist. What difference would it make if one liked or disliked Freud? At around 
this time, the definitely non-Freudian psychiatrist Ernst Kretschmer wrote: »Man 
hasste Freud, aber man glaubte an ihn ,/ - »One hated Freud, but one believed in 
him. « In a different way, Kretschmer's observation makes the same point as 
Keynes: like him or not, Freud must be reckoned with. 
Let me leave for the moment Keynes's two significant contributions to the de-
bate over psychoanalysis in 1925 - the fundamental importance of Freud as the 
principal figure of our Zeitgeist, and the fact that Freud calls principally on our in-
tuitions, not on the scientific requirement to be shown evidence - to proceed to 
show that our understanding of this debate can be deepened by placing it in some 
context. As a historian of science, of ideas, one should ask questions of the sort: 
Who are the protagonists in the debate? where and when is the debate taking 
place? what are the implicit criteria guiding and funnelling the debate? 
The obvious first question concerns the forum of the debate. I presented 
Keynes's contribution as an ordinary letter in The Nation & The Athenceum. Why, 
then, was it written pseudonymously, signed Siela? The principal reason is that 
Keynes at the time effectively owned and controlled the magazine, having taken it 
over in early 1923, as an organ for the dissemination of his brand of New Liberal 
political and economic views. 10 Installing a colleague from Cambridge as Editor, 
bringing in Leonard Woolf, founder of the Hogarth Press (publisher of the Freud 
translations from 1924 on) as Literary Editor when T. S. Eliot turned the job down, 
in the period 1923-25 Keynes oversaw every detail of the magazine, andin the en-
tire life of the magazine from May 1923 to February 1931, when it merged with the 
New Statesman, Keynes contributed 155 pieces, including fifty articles on domestic 
policy, forty on debts and war reparations, five book reviews, twelve anonymous 
contributions and fourteen letters - a journalist on another newspaper described 
him as an »ungovernable soda-water siphon«.11 This superabundance of contribu-
tions helps explain his pseudonymity. And the control he exerted, alongside that of 
Leonard Woolf, who brought in all his Bloomsbury and Hogarth Press friends and 
authors, meant that it was clearly a house journal for Cambridge economics and 
Bloomsbury's literary, aesthetic and moral views. 
Keynes's position as controller of the public medium meant that he may have 
cared to keep the debate going. As Ernest Jones was to remark thirty years later, 
this was a »heated polemical discussion between (Tansley, J. F.) and three very bit-
ter opponents. ( ... ) Some of the language used by the latter rivalled the German ou-
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tbursts before the war ( ... )« 12 Keynes would no doubt have liked a partisan of 
Freud's to have stepped into the breach; with Tansley botanizing out of England in 
August, he may have been casting around for someone to make good copy for a li-
vely debate; as an interventionist proprietor he would have had no compunction in 
playing that role himself. lt is not certain that this played a factor, but it is plau-
sible. Of such conjunctions may heated polemics be on occasion wrought. 
Freud's Collected Papers were published by Leonard Woolf's Hogarth Press, 
and translated by James and Alix Stracey, and Joan Riviere - all members of the 
Bloomsbury group, whose contact with Keynes went back to weil before the First 
World War. However, A. G. Tansley, the reviewer commissioned by Woolf, was not 
a Bloomsbury figure, but was nonetheless equally tied to Freud and psychoanaly-
sis.13 In his most psychoanalytically active period, from 1919 to 1927, he was one 
of the founders of a Cambridge psychoanalysis group which met for papers and 
discussions, whose pre-condition for entry was having had experience of analysis. 
The members of this group were James Strachey (like Tansley just returned from 
analysis with Freud in Vienna), John Rickman (then working as a psychiatrist), 
Frank Ramsey (mathematician and philosopher, protege of Keynes, translator of 
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus into English, whose time in Vienna in 1924 
had been divided between intimate conversations with Wittgenstein and analysis 
with Theodor Reik), Harold Jeffreys (analysand of Jones and later Ella Freeman 
Sharpe, geophysicist, mathematician, philosopher and botanist) and Lionel Penrose 
(psychologist, biologist and future geneticist). The group often met in King's Col-
lege.14 And the overlap of this group with the secret Cambridge society the Apostles 
is clear: A.W. Verrall, Joan Riviere's uncle joined in 1871, Leonard Woolf in 1902, 
Keynes in 1903, Strachey in 1906, Penrose and Ramsey in 1921.15 
If one adds in Keynes's other Viennese connection of this point in his life, his im-
mersion in Freudian circles is unambiguous. August 1925, when Keynes wrote his 
letter for the magazine, was a busy month for a man who was never anything but 
busy. Having married early in the month, he was forced to accept Ludwig Wittgen-
stein as a house-guest a few days later. Wittgenstein arrived penniless on the 20 
August and stayed for six days at the Keynes's summer cottage. 16 He may even have 
been peering over Keynes's shoulder as he wrote the letter. At the end of the month, 
Keynes and his new wife, the ballerina Lydia Lopokova left for the Soviet Union, so 
he could meet his new relations. Do we have any evidence about what Keynes and 
Wittgenstein talked about in those days? 
The philosopher Frank Ramsey visited Keynes's cottage on 20'h August 1925 -
the day before Ramsey was to be married - expressly to see Wittgenstein. He wrote 
to his fiancee: 
»! got here at tea time yesterday, and went for a long walk with Keynes and Wittgenstein and had 
a very good dinner .... Keynes and Wittgenstein are awfully nice together but I can't get a word in, 
they both talk such a lot. I got slightly heated because W said that Freud was morally deficient 
though very clever. To-day K has gone up to town on business and it is pouring with rain; how I 
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shall amuse W I can't think because he doesn't much like any but the most serious conversation, 
which tends to lead to such violent disagreement as to make it impossible.« 17 
Thus, leaving his house-guests Wittgenstein and Ramsey to work in London on 
that August day, Keynes may weil have written his intervention in the debate about 
Freud with their heated debate in the forefront of his mind; as Freudian enthusiast, 
alongside all the others he knew, and there were many, he might have been thinking 
of young Frank Ramsey; as critic of Freud, he might have had not only Wohlge-
muth and his acolytes in mind, but also the redoubtable Wittgenstein. 
And what might Wittgenstein's views on Freud at that time have been? What-
ever the complexities and ambiguities of that position as parsed by recent commen-
tators 18, Wittgenstein never ceased to recognize the extraordinary power of Freud's 
thinking over him and others - indeed, he might weil have been a source for 
Keynes's view that Freud's hold stems from his speaking to our intuitions rather 
than our assessment of inductive inferences. He was not that far off from that pe-
riod, in 1935, when he was considering training as a Freudian psychiatrist in order 
to make the best use of his gifts .19 As Wittgenstein in 1936 put it when he gave 
Maurice Drury, one of his close students The Interpretation of Dreams for a birth-
day present: »Here at last is a psychologist who has something to say« - an attitude 
not far off, perhaps, Keynes's sense of Freud speaking closely to our intuitions. 
Moving beyond a depiction of Keynes's Freudian circles, it is useful to consider 
the general attraction Freudian ideas had for him within his own special areas of in-
terest: the economics and politics of post-war Europe. Keynes had become an inter-
national figure at exactly the same time that Einstein and Freud had, in the period 
immediately following the War, with, in his case, the publication of The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace in December 1919. That polemical indictment of the 
Versailles Treaty included a number of different elements, from his excoriation of 
the blindnesses and character defects of Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George, to 
an audit of the ruinous state of world capitalism. Throughout Keynes's writings -
from his early work on probability (massacred by Ramsey in the 1920s), through 
the Economic Consequences of 1919 into his busy political manoeuvring and pole-
micizing of the 1920s, when his opposition to Britain's return to the gold Standard 
and his attempts to stave off the economic, political and eventually military conse-
quences of the reparations exacted on Germany were his principal concerns, then 
into the 1930s with the publication of his magnum opus The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money in 1936 - there is a fundamental vision of econo-
mics as grounded on psychology. Like his other Bloomsbury group members, 
Keynes was fundamentally critical of a foundational Victorian value: that of saving 
and fear of the future. His account of the Great Depression, then, would point to 
the underperformance of the economies of the West as due to too great account 
being given to uncertainty and fear, and too little to the present desires to consume. 
Keynes was the »sort of devil « that would undermine the Victorian virtues of thrift, 
hoarding and miserliness with any means he had to hand. From a certain point of 
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view, saving was a rational means to secure a more prosperous future; Keynes, 
however, emphasized that the excessive desire to save stemmed from general an-
xiety about the future and an inability to enjoy the present. 
Freudianism thus could help supply Keynes with a general psychology of the 
cultural unconscious. In 1919, he had described capitalism as 
»a double bluff or deception. On the one hand the labouring classes accepted from ignorance or 
powerlessness, or were compelled, persuaded or cajoled by custom, convention, authority and the 
well-established order of society into accepting, a situation in which they could call their own very 
little of the cake that they and nature and the capitalists were co-operating to produce. And on the 
other hand the capitalist classes were allowed to call the best part of the cake theirs and were theo-
retically free to consume it, on the tacit underlying condition that they consumed very little of it in 
practice. « 
The ,psychology< of the capitalist classes was thus of crucial importance to the 
functioning of the system. In his Treatise on Money (1930) , a diatribe against those 
who would re-introduce the gold Standard, freely employing the language of plea-
sure postponed or indulged in, a language that stemmed from its utilitarian and 
now Freudian versions of the reality principle, he depicted those conservative forces 
who saw in gold the »sole prophylactic against the plague of fiat moneys « as thro-
wing over themselves »a furtive Freudian cloak « - the unconscious attachment to 
gold that Freud's essay on anal erotism had described.20 Money Keynes described as 
a »subtle device for linking the present to the future «.21 But if money were held for 
long out of circulation, it ceased to be money, it de-monetizes - in the Freudian 
dialect that Keynes appreciated, gold turned back into faeces. Excessive anxiety 
about the future based on an inability to enjoy the present provoked regression 
back to a past fixation, that of the anal stage, in which pleasure was gained in 
hoarding faeces; money is thus a device »through which the fear of the future takes 
its revenge on the hopes of the present.« 22 
Thus Keynes's economics required a psychological underpinning: for its por-
trayal of the economic virtues which, under changed circumstances, would become 
vices leading to the disaster of the Great Depression. Keynes was a psychologist of 
economics before he became a Freudian; but Freud was ideally suited to the kind of 
portrait of the bourgeoisie and its unconscious character-traits that Keynes's eco-
nomics required. When he spoke in 1925 of »the appeal which (Freud's theories, 
]. F.) make to our own intuitions as containing something new and true about the 
way in which human psychology works «, he meant not only our intuitions about, 
for example, why he himself was bisexual, or why his friends< character-traits were 
the way they were, but also intuitions about what are the principal motors of world 
economic history: is it the entrepreneurs or the savers who have created wealth? 
This economic-historical question was also, for Keynes, a question about psycho-
logy. No wonder that, in October 1919, when he was completing the Economic 
Consequences, he met up with the new King's College undergraduates and spent an 
hour talking about Freud with one of them, Richard Braithwaite, remarking in a 
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letter afterwards: »Thank God, there's an intelligent man in College.« 23 
Having sketched in what a cynic might call the Freudian coterie, and given some 
account of why Keynes was so sympathetic to Freud, we can ask: what of the cri-
tics? Of Miss Allmond, I have discovered little. A. Wohlgemuth, born in Berlin in 
1868, was a psychologist trained from 1904 on at University College, London, 
whose dissertation was on The After-effect of Seen Movement (published as a mo-
nograph in 1911); in 1919 he also published Pleasure-unpleasure. An experimental 
investigation of the feeling elements. Never a member of staff, his academic activi-
ties were curtailed by an accident during the First World War. Sir Bryan Donkin 
was a physician who retired from practice before 1900; he wrote an introduction to 
a small book of 1924 Psycho-Analysts Analysed, by another retired doctor F. 
McBride. 
The substantial voice in these critics was that of Wohlgemuth. In his book of 
1923, he examined all the principal claims of psychoanalysis chapter by chapter. 
His tone is very varied, often being contemptuous, often angry, expounding his dis-
agreements in very great pedantic detail: railing against the way Freud writes Ger-
man, against the complex interpretation of serpents in dreams and mythology deve-
loped by Herbert Silberer and Ernest Jones. The principal argument is the base-
lessness and illogicality of Freud's principal arguments, for the unconscious, for re-
pression, for censorship. Yet Wohlgemuth makes no attempt to conceal the emotio-
nal reactions, common to many of Freud's readers, in the early years of this cen-
tury: 
» When I read for the first time Freud's exposition of the ,Oedipus-Complex, I passed, as probably 
most people have clone on like occasions, through a series of emotional states. ( ... ) there was first a 
violent moral shock, followed by extreme disgust, outraged self-respect, and bitter resentment tur-
ning to rage. This gave place to a transitory contempt for Freud, turning soon to sadness, pessi-
mism, and melancholy. Quickly I reacted against this. I said to myself, if Freud's view is true, all 
our outcry, gesticulation, and denial will not alter it a whit, for truth is truth to the end of recko-
ning. We have simply to face it.« 24 
Yet, besides the analysis of concepts and the refutation of the coherence of the 
unconscious and the censor, Wohlgemuth's principal means of refuting Freud is 
»experimental«, by which he means trusting in his skill as an introspectionist psy-
chologist in detecting the psychological contents Freud posited. Thus, in order to 
refute Freud's claim that human beings oscillate between homosexual and heterose-
xual feeling, Wohlgemuth subjects himself to the rigours of examining every man 
he met, 
»in railway-<:arriages and omnibuses, in the park, at theatres and concerts, at lunch in the restau-
rants, at dinners, meetings, and so on. I chose as objects for these experiments youthful men of 
varying types: the martial figure of the dasning soldier or the brainy and intellectual countenance 
of the thinker, the athlete, or the delicate and dreamy artist - all men who would probably please 
and whose exterior decidedly attracted me. I contemplated them and dwelt upon their personal ad-
vantages, having constantly in mind the purpose of the experiment. I imagined the preliminary pe-
riod of a sexual approach; but I think it unnecessary to enter here into further details of this pro-
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cess, and will state at once the result of these experiments. In no single case have I ever been able to 
discover the slightest trace of libido, whilst I discovered invariably decided repulsion and dis-
gust.«25 
When he conducted a similar control experiment studying his heterosexual fee-
lings, he deliberately chose 
»women whose exterior was decidedly repulsive. Old and decrepit women, and such as were afflic-
ted with some nauseating complaint, women of varying degrees of cleanliness, or rather uncleanli-
ness. In all these cases I have invariably been able to discover sexual conative tendencies and un-
misrakeable libido. lt was vanishingly small as compared with the colossal repulsion feit, yet it was 
unmistakeably there. I thus satisfied myself that my introspecrion in the experiments on men was 
accurate and reliable, as I could not have missed in the one case what I was able to discover in the 
other.« 26 
Thus, when Wohlgemuth entered the controversy in the letter columns of The 
Nation & The Athenceum, on 19 September, after Tansley had responded for a se-
cond time on 12 September, one of his two principal arguments concerned the pos-
sibility of experimental examination of Freud's scientific claims. Tansley had writ-
ten that Wohlgemuth's >»experimental evidence, was quite valueless for the use to 
which Dr. Wohlgemuth put it« 27 and went on to describe Miss Allmond and Dr 
Wohlgemuth's accusation of Freud's »flagrant and persistent disregard of scientific 
method« and »careful control« as »mere pseudo-scientific bombast«; he added: 
» We all know that controlled experiment is by far the most satisfactory method of establishing any 
scientific conclusion. But the method of controlled experiment is simply not available in many 
spheres of scientific investigation, and no one denies them the name of science or refuses to give 
credence to results based on converging lines of evidence. «28 
There spake the botanist, ecologist and psychoanalyst. Wohlgemuth was not 
going to allow this argument; he regarded his introspective experiments as controls 
on psychoanalytic findings - he had retraced Freud's steps and come up with »bet-
ter and less far-fetched« 29 Freud-analyses than Freud had managed in his own ana-
lysis. He repudiated Tansley's claim that there were fields of science in which con-
trolled experiment was not available, asserting that he himself had made and 
published such experiments. »Such controls will,« he added, »suggest themselves 
easily enough to the trained psychologist, though they may worry the dilettante.« 30 
He continued: 
»The critic (i.e. himself, J. F.) has also practised psycho-analysis upon himself and others, as Freud 
did, and has repeated Freud's experiments upon which Freud rests his doctrine, and this with the 
result that he could not accept it.« 31 
Indeed, betraying a remarkable capacity for overlooking the uniquely individual 
character of the method of free assocations, Wohlgemuth then claimed that he had 
taken an example of self-analysis of a seemingly random number, 426718, that 
Freud had published in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, and >»analyzed, it 
with the greatest ease, and my published >analysis< has been adjudged better and 
less far-fetched than Freud's, whose ,Unconscious, was concerned in the promp-
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ting, and not mine.« 32 Wohlgemuth clearly regarded his experiments with Freud's 
numbers and his self-examination while out strolling on station platforms and 
while in restaurants as practising psychoanalysis. The reviewer of Wohlgemuth's 
book for the International Journal, James Strachey, who would have been compli-
mented tobe called a dilettante, saw nothing to worry about; he opened his review 
with the nonchalant words: »This volume is chiefly remarkable for its dust-cover, 
and we therefore propose in this instance to review the dust-cover instead of the 
book which it contains.« 33 
Wohlgemuth captures weil two quite different tones in which stringent criticism 
of Freud were couched in this period: the tone of moral outrage, and the tone of 
professional censure. His entire critical project atJ.d his last dig at Tansley- who, he 
implied, being a distinguished botanist, was not sufficiently aware of the sophistica-
ted experimental protocols which come second-nature to the well-trained psycho-
logist - were based on the view that psychoanalysis represented a threat not to this 
well-trained psychologist, for whom, he wrote at the end of his book, »in general, 
psycho-analysis was still-born, and has ever been as dead as a door-nail« 34, but to 
the general public, to medical men and to educationists, who he observed were in-
creasingly taken in by »the psycho-analytic confidence trick«.35 The tone of moral 
outrage is also candidly avowed, as befits Wohlgemuth's committed disciplined in-
trospectionist methodology; yet he puts this to one side, he claims, since he is expli-
citly and only committed to the truth, whatever its consequences. 
Set against such critics, Tansley noted, were others, also outside psychoanalysis, 
who »find its doctrines in harmony with their independent observation of human 
life.«36 This allusion is no doubt to the language of >intuitions< that Siela employed 
in his letter (we do not know if Tansley knew the identity of its author, though the 
odds are he did). Yet Tansley immediately shifts from this general observation of 
life to the specific business of overcoming one's scepticism with regards Freud: 
»! confess thar at first I was sceptical of very many of the Freudian rheses, and even now there are 
inrerpretations which strike me as far-fetched. Bur I have become very chary of downright unbe-
lief, for in so many cases I have been forced by accumulating evidence to accept inrerpretations 
which at first I rejected as overstrained. Freud generally turns out tobe right.« 37 
This was not, however, to be the last word. Weil into October McBride and 
Wohlgemuth were attacking Tansley and Freud. Then a different voice was heard, 
that of the anonymous ex-patient: 
»in rhe inreresrs of thousands of others who have been sufferers, rhrough no fault of rheir own, I 
may perhaps be permitted to prorest against the foolish and ignorant manner in which such corre-
spondents as Miss Allmond and Dr. McBride have attempted to discredit a system of medical rrear-
ment whose powers to srrengrhen and ro heal the mentally afflicted have already been vindicared in 
numerous instances. « 38 
The ex-patient then described his own case, his years of suffering and his eure 
through a three-year psychoanalysis just after the War: 
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» by ehe end of that period, every trace of the shadow had faded into lucid daylight. Since then it 
has never returned, and I have the best of reasons for knowing it can never return - this reason 
being that, in the course of my slow recovery, nearly every aspect of my mental life has been com-
pletely and permanently transformed. « 39 
Giving an account of the process of the analysis in which his long-held doubts 
and scepticism were finally overcome by the weight of evidence and his entire trans-
formation - »physical, mental and moral«, the ex-patient took special pains to re-
fute Wohlgemuth's »pretentious treatise« on three grounds: his refusal to accept the 
concept of subliminal mind in general, entirely independently of Freudian theories; 
his refusal to take account of the confirmatory experiences of patients themselves, 
and, lastly, »the whole body of evidence adduced by psychical research. « For this 
ex-patient, the experiments of these researchers can be explained in either one of 
two ways: through the »spiritualistic alternative « or through the hypothesis of an 
»active sub-conscious«. For this reason, the critics of psychoanalysis should »ex-
plain why they have not adopted the spiritualistic alternative. « 
In his biography of Freud, Ernest Jones40 revealed the identity of the author of 
this anonymous letter: Dr lvor Lloyd Tuckett. Tuckett was a physiologist, an exact 
contemporary of Tansley's studying Natural Sciences at Trinity College, Cambridge 
in the 189Os, becoming a Fellow at Trinity in 1895 and later University Demonstra-
tor in Physiology (1899 and then again in 1905), having also trained as a doctor at 
University College London and the Royal London Opthalmic Hospital (qualifying 
in 1898). He had clearly long been interested, like many Cambridge scientists of the 
period, in spiritualism, publishing Evidence for the Supernatural, 1912. The fact 
that in 1957 Ernest Jones knew the identity of this anonymous contributor to the 
1925 debate makes it highly probable that he was Tuckett's analyst. So, with Tans-
ley, Keynes (pseudonymously) and Tuckett (anonymously) making up the trio of 
defenders of Freud against the intemperate attacks of Wohlgemuth and his »f!y-
ing-squad «41 of co-conspirators, it looks very much as if, once the true identities 
are revealed, the Freud enthusiasts consisted solely of eminent Cambridge scien-
tists, one a botanist-analyst, one a physiologist-analysand, one a >sort of devik 
Keynes ordered the debate closed in late October 1925 and then published a 
two-part article by James Glover, one of the pre-eminent orthodox Freudian Lon-
don analysts, to put the case for the scientific credentials of psychoanalysis in res-
pectable - and unanswered - prose. 
Let me draw some of the Strands together. 
The first thing to remember is that a public spat may be a rather well-orchestra-
ted ritual dance. The three principal Freudian critics of 1925 referred to each 
other's writings, wrote prefaces for each others's books and adopted something of a 
united front. On the other side, Keynes probably intervened to keep the debate 
going - which does not mean that he did not regard the debate of first-rank impor-
tance, quite the opposite - and it is fair to say that on anormal day, his magazine 
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was stuffed full of faithful Freudians. In addition, those defending Freud turn out, 
surely not solely by coincidence, tobe Cambridge dons, from Trinity and King's. So 
as a historian, one wants to know a little more about magazine ownership, private 
agendas, coordinated strategies of using the media and so forth. 42 
What are the lessons to be extracted from this episode? Let me return to the 
three strands that Keynes wove into his letter: »inductive verifications «, »our in-
tuitions « and Freud as a »sort of devil « for his age. 
1. Inductive verifications: Those sympathetic to Freud, particularly Tansley and 
Keynes, both admitted that the inductive verifications of his theories had not been 
made available. Tansley tussled with Wohlgemuth over the issue of experimental 
controls: the key issue is what other sorts of evidence are convincing and trustwor-
thy if such controls are not available? The Freud-bashers of 1925 certainly allowed 
no other variety of science than the experimental, even if their version of the expe-
rimental consisted in rigorous inspection of the state of the experimenter's libidinal 
desires while watching attractive young men board the train for work. In this fetis-
hism of the experimental, little has changed when it comes to >scientific bombast<. 
Tansley the observational ecologist and Keynes the mathematical modeller of 
macroeconomic systems had little interest or need for experiment. Whether ecology 
and economics are sciences without such experimental controls is a question that 
clearly lurks behind the war raging over psychoanalysis. The third pro-Freudian, 
Tuckert, did wish to introduce confirmatory evidence, drawn from the therapeutic 
successes of psychoanalytic treatment; but even he, working in the Cambridge Phy-
siology Laboratory alongside of Sherrington, thought the crucial experiments were 
those conducted by >psychical researchers<. 
2. Intuitions<: lt is here that Keynes adds a third way of crucial importance bet-
ween those of the partisans convinced by their own experience and the sceptics ap-
palled at the confidence-tricks pulled by charlatans on a gullible public. I have sket-
ched in the kind of world that Keynes inhabited - the free-thinking and -living 
Bloomsbury set, an economist seeking a foundation in psychology for his theoreti-
cal and practical doctrines - that may have made him liable to find Freud's work 
speaking to his independent intuitions about human psychology. The !ist of those 
who feel the way Keynes did are endless. Most of those enthusiastic about Freud on 
first acquaintance usually experience their reading of him as a revelation because he 
speaks to the intuitions they did not even know they had. Often enough, they grow 
out of their enthusiasm without feeling the need to repudiate Freud. To take a re-
cent example: the English novelist Ian McEwan was recently asked in a magazine 
interview, ,Which book changed your life?< He replied: »Freud's The Psychopatho-
logy of Everyday Life. The very idea of an unconscious made me think about writ-
ing in a completely different way. « He then added: » Today, Freud means little to 
43 me. « 
Returning to the question of intentions: Introducing one modern writer of fic-
tion reminds us of that other argument of Keynes's which is so striking - the idea 
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that Freud may have invented all of his cases, and yet, for Keynes, this would not 
alter his view of Freud at all. In other words, Keynes recognized and accepted the 
porous boundary between psychoanalysis and imagination, the world of fiction, 
which has been so important a part of the presence of psychoanalysis in the culture 
of the twentieth century. Then, and now, for many of Freud's critics the porosity of 
the boundary between fiction and ,reality< is what frightens them and leads them to 
an outright condemnation of psychoanalysis in the name of science. Wohlgemuth 
himself confessed that he was strongly attracted to Freud's theory of dreams until 
he read Freud's analysis of Jensen's Gradiva, and realized with a shock that Freud 
applied his method to both real and fictional dreams. lt was at that moment that he 
became avirulent anti-Freudian. 44 For us, older but maybe no wiser than Keynes, 
we see in this recognition the vision of psychoanalysis as the dream of the twentieth 
century, with Freud its dreamer. 
But it is also clear that there will be many if not more people whose intuitions 
about human psychology require the repudiation of Freudian theory. They can find 
nothing in their minds that gives any hint of an unconscious; they find the very no-
tion of infantile sexuality or repressed homosexuality implausible, against common 
sense and in some deep sense unfair, a violation of the principle of charity. This 
point, it should be noted, is not the same as the question about the emotions arou-
sed by Freudian theory. Clearly Tansley found Freud's theories repulsive and gro-
tesque in some sense; but they spoke immediately to his intuitions while they also 
roused his scepticism and resistance. 
We may add that what Keynes meant by intuitions might well correspond to 
what is now called folk psychology. But Keynes's term has far greater force because 
intuitions includes a substantive content that the term folk psychology often lacks. 
The sort of ,thing< an intuition is must be some kind of inner measure or Standard -
a dick which tells us that ,people are like that< (or not). Thus we might see Keynes's 
position as an early version of the thesis that psychoanalysis is an extension of folk 
psychology - though I would prefer to return to the language of intuitions than try 
to make do with the mechanistic and finally condescending term folk psychology. 
3. The fundamental emotional reaction to Freud must be included under 
Keynes's third heading: Freud as »one of the great disturbing, innovating geniuses 
of our age, that is to say as a sort of devil. « For those like Keynes who were the 
shit-stirrers of their time - and I choose my words carefully - Freud was a powerful 
and welcome ally. Many disciplines and many thinkers looked to psychology for a 
foundation, in the same way Keynes sought to build economics on a psychological 
analysis of the virtue of thrift and the love of money. In anthropology, sociology, le-
gal studies, recourse to psychology was an endemic temptation. Freud's dark and 
fragmentary psychology, with its emphasis on sex, its respect for and generosity to-
wards the irrational, appeared to be the work of just the sort of devil whose temper 
the age required. One difference in our own Freud-bashing age is that it is no lon-
ger so easy for the Keyneses of our day to dismiss the anti-Freudians as conserva-
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tive forces whose day is almost up. Our culture is less sure whether Freud belongs 
to the radical future or to a conservative past. Certainly the thirst for Freud's kind 
of psychology is not feit in economics or anthropology, where analysis of consumer 
behaviour based on rational choice theory or calculations of kinship structures 
based on maximal mating strategies are much more likely to slip through the 
grant-vetting committees unchallenged. Yet the very passions of our Freud Wars 
bear witness to the fact that there's life in the old devil yet. We still may not know if 
it's the right kind of life or the right kind of devil. He was, after all, a rather know-
ing devil. Remember the epigraph of The Interpretation of Dreams: Flectere si ne-
queo superos, Acheronta movebo - If Heaven I cannot bend, then Hell I will 
arouse. 
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